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Executive  Summary  
The  purpose  of  this  survey  is  to  collect,  analyze,  and  publish  useful  baseline  benchmarking  information  about  
the  NSF  science  community’s  cybersecurity  programs,  practices,  challenges,  and  concerns.  We  received  23  2
responses  to  this  year’s  survey,  including  19  from  respondents  with  annual  budgets  greater  than  $1M,  and  14  
from  NSF  Major  Facilities.  The  mean  total  budget  of  respondents  was  $30,800,000  and  the  median  budget  
was  $22,000,000.  This  was  the  third  year  of  the  NSF  Community  Cybersecurity  Benchmarking  Survey.  
Highlights  from  the  results  and  findings  include  the  following:  
A. Respondents’  cybersecurity  budgets  continue  to  vary  widely,  with  Major  Facilities  having  budgets  ranging  
from  1%  to  25%  of  IT  budget,  with  a  mean  of  7.5%.  This  is  a  slight  increase  in  cybersecurity  spending  
from  2017,  which  had  a  range  of  0.2%  to  26%  of  IT  budget,  with  a  mean  of  6.8%.   
B. 4  of  the  14  Major  Facility  respondents  did  not  provide  a  discrete  cybersecurity  budget  or  had  a  budget  of  
$0.  This  is  largely  the  same  as  the  2017  survey  (4  of  15  Large  Facility  respondents).  
C. 11  of  23  respondents  claimed  their  organization  has  dedicated  adequate  resources  (e.g.  budget,  personnel,  
tools)  to  their  cybersecurity  program.  7  respondents  claimed  their  organization  has  not  dedicated  
adequate  resources,  and  5  responded  “not  sure.”  Interestingly,  3  respondents  who  felt  their  cybersecurity  
program  had  adequate  resources  did  not  provide  a  cybersecurity  budget.  
D. All  respondents  either  have  a  cybersecurity  program  (16)  or  are  in  the  process  of  establishing  one  (7).  
E. 15  of  23  respondents  have  a  CISO  or  equivalent  role  (8  full-time;  7  part-time).  This  is  down  from  2017,  
where  16  of  20  respondents  had  CISOs.  However,  the  number  of  full-time  CISOs  increased,  from  4  of  
20  in  2017  to  8  of  23  in  2019.  10  of  14  Major  Facilities  have  a  CISO  (3  full-time;  7  part-time).  This  is  
comparable  to  2017,  where  12  of  15  LFs  had  CISOs  (2  full-time;  10  part  time).  
F. 21  respondents  have  cybersecurity  full-time  employees  (FTEs)  (including  partial  FTEs).  10  have  the  
equivalent  of  one  cyber  FTE  or  greater.  This  is  comparable  to  2017,  where  19  of  20  respondents  
identified  some  level  of  cyber  FTE  effort,  with  8  having  the  equivalent  of  one  cyber  FTE  or  greater.  
G. The  large  majority  of  respondents  authenticate  users  from  multiple  institutions,  with  14  authenticating  
from  more  than  3  external  sites,  and  20  authenticating  from  at  least  2.  
H. 17  of  23  (~75%)  respondents  use  multi-factor  authentication.  This  continues  the  trend  of  increasing  
adoption  of  MFA,  from  6  out  of  27  (22%)  in  2016,  to  12  out  of  20  (60%)  in  2017.   
I. Residual  risk  acceptance  is  widely  practiced,  with  Senior  Management  of  Principle  Investigators  as  the  
most  common  risk  acceptor.  3  respondents  had  no  process  for  residual  risk  acceptance.  This  is  a  
significant  change  from  2017,  where  9  of  20  respondents  had  no  process  for  residual  risk  acceptance.  
J. The  most  commonly  cited  control  sets  were  NIST  800-171  (5)  (despite  only  2  handling  CUI),  the  CIS  
controls  (4),  and  FISMA  low/moderate  (4).  5  respondents  had  not  selected  a  baseline  control  set.  
K. 16  of  23  respondents  develop  and  adopt  cybersecurity  policies,  but  7  of  those  respondents  explicitly  
acknowledge  that  they  do  not  properly  follow  and  enforce  their  own  policies.  
L. The  most  common  cybersecurity  requirements  arose  from  NSF  Cooperative  Agreements  (13),  State  PII  
laws  (11),  and  non-disclosure  agreements  (8).  
M. 21  of  23  respondents  develop  software,  including  all  14  Major  Facilities.  1  respondent  develops  in  only  
compiled  languages,  4  only  in  interpreted  languages,  and  16  develop  in  both.  
N. Coding  practices  were  widely  practiced.  The  least  common  coding  practices  were  static  and  dynamic  
analysis  (4),  code  signing  (4),  and  automated  documentation  tools  (6).   
O. Patching  times  are  highly  variable,  with  critical  patches  ranging  from  2  days  up  to  a  month  to  implement.   
P. 4  of  23  respondents  detected  3  or  more  incidents,  and  9  detected  at  least  one  incident.   
2  Note,  we  do  not  track  the  extent  to  which  the  current  years’  respondents  overlap  with  previous  years’  respondents.  
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1  Introduction  
Benchmarking  information  is  frequently  used  to  develop  a  common  sense  of  status  and  norms  
within  a  community  or  sector.  At  the  2015  NSF  Cybersecurity  Summit,  the  audience  indicated  that  
there  was  interest  in  generating  a  survey  of  the  state  of  cybersecurity  for  the  NSF  science  
community,  and  that  the  community  would  respond  to  the  survey  and  utilize  the  results.  Based  on  
this  positive  feedback,  Trusted  CI  established  the  Community  Survey  project,  and  conducted  its  first  
annual  community  survey  in  2016.  This  is  the  third  Community  Survey  report.  
 
The  purpose  of  Trusted  CI’s  Community  Survey  project  is  to  collect,  analyze,  and  publish  useful  
baseline  benchmarking  information  about  the  NSF  science  community’s  cybersecurity  programs,  
practices,  challenges,  and  concerns.  
 
The  remainder  of  this  report  is  as  follows:  Section  2  describes  the  methodology  for  constructing  the  
survey  and  collecting  responses;  Section  3  presents  an  overview  of  the  survey  data  collected;  Section  
4  provides  our  analysis  of  the  survey  data;  and  Section  5  concludes  with  broader  reflections.  
 
2  Methodology  
In  this  section,  we  describe  our  target  respondent  community,  target  audience  for  this  report,  survey  
construction,  and  response  collection.  
 
2.1  Responding  Community  and  Audience  
2.1.1  NSF  Project  Community  
NSF  awards  approximately  27%  of  the  total  federal  budget  for  basic  research,  supporting  over  
350,000  researchers,  post-doctoral  fellows,  trainees,  teachers,  and  students.   Among  the  NSF’s  active  3
awards  are  20  NSF  Major  Facilities  (MF),  previously  referred  to  as  Large  Facilities.   This  survey  was  4
targeted  to  the  NSF  community  of  science  projects  and  facilities.  
2.1.2  Audience  for  This  Report  
We  envision  three  primary  audiences  for  this  report:  
● NSF-funded  science  projects  and  facilities .  The  survey  results  may  assist  large  science  
projects  and  facilities  in  developing  a  sense  of  norms  and  practices  in  the  community.  
● NSF  leadership  and  program  officers .  The  survey  results  may  give  NSF  leadership  and  
program  officers  greater  insight  into  norms  and  practices  in  the  community.  
● Trusted  CI .  The  survey  results  will  assist  Trusted  CI  in  tailoring  its  services  to  the  current  
state  of  cybersecurity  at  NSF-funded  projects  and  facilities.  
3  https://www.nsf.gov/news/news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=100595   
4  See  https://www.nsf.gov/bfa/lfo/docs/major-facilities-list.pdf .  Note,  Major  Facilities  are  broken  down  into  20  
programs,  with  12  subprograms.   
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2.2  Survey  Construction  
We  designed  survey  questions  to  collect  information  on  respondents’  budgets  and  other  descriptive  
attributes  relevant  to  cybersecurity,  including  information  on  specific  cybersecurity  practices,  events,  
and  concerns.  From  Nov.  6,  2018  through  Jan.  4,  2019,  we  took  proposals  from  Trusted  CI  to  
improve  the  survey.  A  text  copy  of  the  survey  is  included  as  Appendix  A.  
 
Response  to  this  survey  was  voluntary  and  optional.  To  encourage  a  higher  response  rate  and  more  
complete  responses,  we  purposely  avoided  collecting  project  identifying  information,  such  as  project  
names  or  award  numbers.  Responses  were  collected  using  Google  Forms.  
 
2.3  Response  Collection  
The  survey  was  announced  on  May  23,  2019  on  the  Trusted  CI  “Announce”  mailing  list.  The  survey  
was  further  promoted  on  Trusted  CI’s  Blog  on  July  3,  2019,  through  the  XSEDE  mailing  list,  and  
during  the  Large  Facility  Security  Team  meetings  during  the  months  of  May,  June,  and  July.  
Reminders  were  posted  to  the  Trusted  CI  Announce  email  list  on  July  18,  July  29,  and  July  31.  The  
response  period  to  the  survey  closed  on  July  31,  2019.   
 
2.4  Response  Evaluation  
Responses  were  evaluated  at  face  value,  despite  some  responses  falling  far  outside  of  expected  
ranges.  Averages  were  calculated  based  solely  on  non-null/non-zero  responses  in  calculating  average;  
including  null/zero  responses  in  the  budget  averages  would  have  skewed  the  results  and  led  to  
misleading  averages.  
 
The  responses  were  compiled  in  a  spreadsheet,  with  questions  broken  down  to  represent  each  
possible  answer  when  multiple  answers  were  allowed,  and  with  additional  space  for  calculated  
answers,  such  as  the  respondent’s  cybersecurity  budget  as  a  percentage  of  IT  budget.  This  
spreadsheet  was  utilized  to  develop  a  preliminary  analysis  of  the  results,  culminating  in  the  
development  of  a  Preliminary  Findings  document  that  was  circulated  on  the  Trusted  CI  team  listserv  
on  Oct  7,  2019.  
 
3  Results  
Below,  we  provide  a  high  level  picture  of  the  response  rates  and  the  categories  of  respondents  that  
emerged  in  this  response  group.   
 
3.1  Response  Rates  
The  survey  received  23  responses.  In  light  of  the  thousands  of  active  NSF  awards,  we  caution  against  
any  conclusion  that  these  results  are  representative  of  the  community  at  large.  However,  we  received  
responses  from  14  NSF  Major  Facilities,  plus  5  additional  responses  from  awards  with  annual  
budgets  greater  than  $1,000,000.  
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3.2  Response  Categorization  
Using  the  methodology  set  out  from  the  2016  survey,   we  continued  to  group  the  respondents  by  5
annual  budget,  with  the  three  categories  consisting  of:  1.  Major  Facilities  (15)  -  a  specific  
designation  by  NSF;  2.  Big  (3)  -  respondents  with  annual  budgets  over  $1M;  and  3.  Small  (1)  -  
respondents  with  annual  budgets  under  $1M.  Considering  the  high  relative  response  rate  of  Major  
Facilities  on  this  year’s  survey  (15  out  of  the  20  respondents),  our  analysis  is  primarily  related  to  the  
cybersecurity  of  Major  Facilities,  but  does  include  a  discussion  of  the  other,  non-MF  respondents.  
 
4  Analysis  
In  this  section,  we  provide  high  level  analysis  of  the  survey  responses,  highlighting  results  that  were  
particularly  interesting,  unexpected,  notable,  or  concerning.  Additionally,  we  compare  the  results  to  
past  years’  surveys,  and  highlight  any  trends  or  deviations  we  find.   Considering  the  majority  of  6
respondents  were  Major  Facilities,  our  analysis  is  largely  focused  on  the  security  implications  for  
Major  Facilities.  The  relevant  survey  question  is  denoted  with  a  letter-number  pair  in  square  brackets  
(e.g.,  [Q6])  (for  the  full  question  text,  see  Appendix  A).  
 
4.1  Project  or  Facility  Budget  
Respondents  were  asked  to  provide  the  annual  budget  [Q3],  the  annual  IT  budget  [Q4],  and  the  
annual  cybersecurity  budget  [Q5]  for  their  project  or  facility.  Annual  budgets  among  the  Major  
Facilities  ranged  from  $1M  to  $100M,  with  a  mean  of  $43M  and  median  of  $38M.   Despite  this  7
already  significant  variation  in  total  budgets,  cybersecurity  budgets  among  the  respondents  varied  
considerably,  with  4  Major  Facilities  not  being  able  to  provide  a  cybersecurity  budget,  and  others  as  
low  as  $1000,  while  at  the  high  end  cybersecurity  budgets  reached  $1.3M.  Similar  to  past  years,  this  
variability  seemed  to  increase  when  controlling  for  IT  budget,  with  MF’s  cybersecurity  budgets  
ranging  from  1%  to  25%  of  IT  budget.  Among  all  respondents,  the  median  cybersecurity  budget  as  
a  percentage  of  IT  budget  was  5%,  and  the  mean  was  7.5%.  Notably,  this  falls  within  the  normal  
range  across  a  number  of  industries.  8
 
As  found  in  previous  years,  one  potential  explanation  for  the  variability  in  cybersecurity  budgets  is  
the  lack  of  uniformity  in  what  costs  are  included  in  the  cybersecurity  budget.  Among  organizations  
with  cybersecurity  budgets,  5  did  not  include  labor,  2  did  not  include  hardware,  and  5  did  not  include  
software  [Q6].   
 
5  Note,  the  methodology  has  updated  from  “Large  Facilities”  to  “Major  Facilities,”  in  keeping  with  NSF  classification.  
6  Note  again  that  we  do  not  track  overlap  in  respondents  between  years.  
7  These  numbers  were  slightly  lower  than  2017,  which  ranged  from  $8M  to  $100M,  with  a  mean  of  $45M  and  median  of  
$40M.  
8  See,  e.g. ,  Scott  Russell,  Craig  Jackson,  Robert  Cowles,  Cybersecurity  Budgeting:  A  Survey  of  Benchmarking  Research  and  
Recommendations  to  Organizations,  presented  at  and  published  in  the  report  of  the  2016  NSF  Cybersecurity  Summit,  
Arlington,  VA,  17  Aug  2016.   
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  MF  category   Overall  
Cybersecurity  as  %  of  Annual  Budget  
(non-zero  mean  value)  
0.51%   0.56%  
Cybersecurity  as  %  of  Annual  Budget  
(non-zero  range)  
0.01%  -  1.39%   0.01%  -  1.39%  
Cybersecurity  as  %  of  IT  Budget  
(non-zero  mean  value)  
7.9%   7.5%  
Cybersecurity  as  %  of  IT  Budget  
(non-zero  range)  
1%  -  25%   1%  -  25%  
 
Finally,  a  new  question  in  the  2019  survey  asked  respondents  whether  they  felt  their  organization  has  
devoted  adequate  resources  (e.g.,  budget,  personnel,  tools)  to  their  cybersecurity  program  [Q7].  11  
of  23  respondents  claim  their  organization  has  dedicated  adequate  resources  to  their  cybersecurity  
program.  7  respondents  claimed  their  organization  has  not  dedicated  adequate  resources,  and  5  
responded  “not  sure.”  Interestingly,  3  respondents  who  indicated  “yes”  did  not  have  a  cybersecurity  
budget,  whereas  the  respondent  with  the  highest  cybersecurity  budget  (in  dollars)  indicated  that  they  
did  not  have  adequate  resources.  Notably,  respondents  who  did  not  employ  a  CISO  were  much  
more  likely  to  feel  that  they  did  not  have  adequate  resources  or  would  be  uncertain  (6  of  8).  The  
inverse  appears  to  not  be  true,  however,  as  respondents  with  a  CISO  were  not  more  likely  to  believe  
they  had  adequate  resources  than  that  they  did  not  have  adequate  resources.  
 
4.2  Project  or  Facility  Attributes  
Survey  questions  in  this  group  were  meant  to  uncover  information  about  the  environment  in  which  
cybersecurity  takes  places.   
 
4.2.1  Nearly  all  respondents  had  complex  authentication  environments,  with  20  of  23  
accommodating  users  from  multiple  external  institutions  [Q6]  and  14  indicating  a  need  to  
authenticate  from  more  than  three  external  institutions.  These  responses  were  largely  irrespective  of  
annual  budget,  with  6  non-Large  Facilities  authenticating  from  more  than  three  external  locations,  
and  one  Large  Facility  not  authenticating  from  any  external  locations.  These  results  largely  mirror  
those  from  previous  surveys.  Future  surveys  may  benefit  from  clarifying  the  types  of  locations  that  
are  being  authenticated  from  (e.g.  multiple  facilities  controlled  by  the  same  entity;  employees  
working  from  home;  third  parties  seeking  access  to  facility  resources;  etc.)  
 
4.2.2  The  role  of  cybersecurity  officers,  (such  as  a  CISO,  ISO,  or  CSO),  varied  greatly  among  the  
respondents  as  well  (Q8].  The  majority  of  respondents  had  a  cybersecurity  officer  (15  of  23;  10  of  14  
Major  Facilities),  of  which  8  were  full-time  and  7  were  part-time.  Although  this  is  a  lower  percentage  
of  respondents  with  a  CISO  from  2017  (16  of  20  in  2017  vs.  15  of  23  in  2019),  the  percentage  of  
respondents  with  a  full-time  CISO  notably  increased  (from  4  of  16  to  8  of  15).  However,  as  with  
8  
previous  years,  the  practice  of  employing  a  CISO  appears  to  be  fairly  erratic .  For  instance,  the  
respondent  with  the  largest  cybersecurity  budget  as  a  percentage  of  IT  budget  (25%)  did  not  employ  
a  CISO,  whereas  5  respondents  employed  a  CISO  without  having  a  cybersecurity  budget.  Moreover,  
7  respondents  that  do  not  have  a  CISO  still  employ  cybersecurity  FTEs,  whereas  1  respondent  had  a  
full-time  CISO  with  no  cybersecurity  FTEs.  This  variability  in  cybersecurity  leadership  practices  is  
hard  to  reconcile,  and  indicates  that  cybersecurity  governance  is  not  consistently  practiced  across  
facilities.   
 
4.2.3  Cybersecurity  Full  Time  Employees  (FTEs)  [Q9]  roughly  tracked  with  cybersecurity  budgets,  
excepting  those  respondents  who  did  not  include  labor  in  their  budget  calculations  [Q4].  The  clear  
majority  employ  at  least  a  partial  cybersecurity  FTE  (22  of  24).  However,  over  half  of  all  respondents  
(14/24)  employ  the  equivalent  of  1  cyber  FTE  or  less.  
 
4.2.4  21  out  of  24  respondents  developed  or  maintained  software  in  house  [Q9].  Of  those  who  did,  
16  used  both  interpreted  and  compiled  languages.  All  14  Major  Facilities  queried  developed  and  
maintained  software,  of  which  10  used  both  interpreted  and  compiled  languages,  1  used  only  
compiled  languages,  and  3  used  only  interpreted  languages.  Of  the  queried  coding  practices,  Source  
Code  Repositories  (18),  Coding  Standards  (15),  Issue  Tracking/Vulnerability  Management  (13),  and  
Continuous  Integration  (13)  were  the  most  widely  practiced,  whereas  Static  and  Dynamic  Analysis  
(4),  Code  Signing  (5),  and  Automated  Documentation  Tools  (4)  were  the  least  frequently  adopted.  
These  results  largely  mirror  those  from  previous  surveys.   
 
4.3  Cybersecurity  Programs  and  Practices  
4.3.1  All  of  the  respondents  have  either  already  established  a  cybersecurity  program  (16)  or  are  in  the  
process  of  establishing  a  cybersecurity  program  (7)  [Q13].  Most  institutions  engage  their  leadership  
in  cybersecurity  decision  making  either  yearly  or  quarterly  (7  of  23  each)  [Q15].  Whereas  the  
majority  of  risks  are  accepted  by  Senior  Managers  or  PIs  (14)  or  by  IT  managers  (8)  [Q22].  (Note,  
this  is  a  dramatic  increase  from  previous  years;  in  2017,  nearly  half  of  all  respondents  had  no  process  
for  risk  acceptance,  compared  to  only  3  respondents  with  no  process  in  2019.)  Notably,  nearly  half  
of  respondents  identified  multiple  roles  that  accept  risk  (11  of  23),  suggesting  that  risk  acceptance  is  
distributed  throughout  the  organization.  
 
4.3.2  The  most  widely  used  role  for  policy  development  was  an  IT  or  cyber  manager  (13  of  16)  
[Q16].  However,  a  number  of  facilities  or  projects  identified  multiple  organizational  elements  that  
participate  in  policy  development,  with  8  also  using  a  Governance  Board.  (Interestingly,  only  one  
respondent  *only*  utilized  a  governance  board).  Additionally,  10  respondents  relied  on  their  parent  
institution  for  some  portion  of  policy  development.  3  respondents  had  no  process  for  policy  
development.  
 
4.3.3  Nearly  all  respondents  have  policies  covering  system  operators  and  users  (19  of  23)  [Q14],  
whereas  a  majority  of  respondents  have  policies  that  cover  leadership,  owners,  and  third  parties  (14  
9  
of  23).  The  largest  policy  blind  spot  identified  was  covering  vendors,  which  only  7  respondents  have  
policies  for.  Notably,  7  respondents  explicitly  acknowledge  that  they  do  not  adequately  follow  and  
enforce  the  policies  they  create  [Q17].  
 
4.3.4  Over  half  (13  of  23)  of  respondents  utilize  a  baseline  control  set  [Q18].   Of  those  that  do,  the  9
most  commonly  utilized  are  NIST  800-171  (5),  the  CIS  Controls  (4),  and  FISMA  Low/Moderate  
(4).  Interestingly,  roughly  half  of  respondents  have  no  process  for  selecting  additional   (11)  or  10
alternate   controls  (12).  This  suggests  that  institutions  may  need  assistance  in  tailoring  generic  11
guidance  for  the  specific  needs  of  their  organization  and  mission.  
 
4.3.6  The  majority  of  respondents  utilized  additional  cybersecurity  frameworks  and  guidance  (15  of  
23)  [Q19].  The  most  popular  frameworks  were  the  Trusted  CI  Guide  (8  of  23),  NIST  Cybersecurity  
Framework  (4  of  23),  and  NIST  Risk  Management  Framework  (3  of  23).  Interestingly,  these  
numbers  are  universally  lower  than  in  previous  years.  This  may  be  do  to  updates  in  this  year’s  survey  
structure  that  distinguishes  “Baseline  Control  Sets”  from  “Cybersecurity  Frameworks,”  which  are  
often  used  (erroneously)  interchangeably.  More  guidance  on  this  topic  could  be  valuable  to  the  
community.  
 
4.3.7  Nearly  all  respondents  are  subject  to  external  cybersecurity  requirements  (20  of  23)  [Q23],  with  
the  terms  of  their  cooperative  agreement  being  the  most  common  (13  of  23).   Personally  12
Identifiable  Information  (11),  Protected  Health  Information  (6),  and  Non-Disclosure/Contractual  
Agreements  (8)  were  also  fairly  common.   Interestingly,  only  2  respondents  are  subject  to  13
Controlled  Unclassified  Information  (CUI)  requirements,  despite  NIST’s  CUI  baseline  control  set  
(SP  800-171)  being  the  most  commonly  utilized  baseline  control  set  identified  in  Question  18.  
 
4.3.8  Programmatic  safeguards  were  overall  more  widely  adopted  than  in  previous  years  [Q25],  with  
16  respondents  implementing  an  overarching  cybersecurity  strategy,  16  having  documented  
cybersecurity  standards,  14  adopting  a  specific  incident  response  policy,  14  utilizing  a  business  
continuity  plan,  14  utilizing  an  inventory,  14  reviewing  security  intelligence  products,  and  13  
9  A  "baseline  control  set"  is  a  predetermined  set  of  security  controls  used  as  a  default  for  organizations  when  selecting  
security  controls  for  their  assets.  Examples  of  baseline  control  sets  include:  the  CIS  Controls,  the  ASD  Essential  Eight,  
and  FISMA  Moderate  (via  NIST  SP  800-53).  
10  Additional  controls  are  “controls  selected  beyond  those  specified  in  the  baseline  control  set.  Reasons  for  selecting  an  
additional  control  include:  to  address  a  particularized  threat;  to  address  an  unacceptable  risk;  to  satisfy  a  compliance  
requirement;  or  to  satisfy  a  contractual  obligation.”  
11  Alternate  controls  are  “controls  selected  instead  of  controls  in  the  baseline  control  set.  Reasons  for  selecting  an  
alternate  control  in  place  of  a  baseline  control  include:  improves  employee  quality  of  life;  better  addresses  the  
organization's  operating  environment;  better  addresses  the  organization's  unique  risk  profile;  or  the  baseline  control  was  
too  costly  to  implement.”  
12  Note,  that  all  Large  Facilities  are  subject  to  cooperative  agreement  terms,  so  at  least  one  Large  Facility  is  not  aware  of  
the  cybersecurity  requirements  listed  in  their  CA.  Additionally,  two  respondents  identified  both  “none”  and  “cooperative  
agreement  terms  from  NSF,”  suggesting  some  potential  confusion.  
13  One  respondent  wrote  in  the  European  Union’s  General  Data  Protection  Regulation  (GDPR),  which  was  not  
presented  as  an  option.  This  will  be  updated  for  future  Surveys.  
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adopting  roadmaps  to  implement  cybersecurity  improvements.  Maturity  Models  (4),  Information  
Security  Governance  structures  (7),  risk  assessments  (10),  and  external  reviews  (10)  were  the  least  
commonly  practiced.  
 
4.3.9  A  subset  of  operational  safeguards  [Q26]  are  widely  adopted,  such  as  firewalls  (22),  physical  
access  control  (19),  central  logging  (18),  anti-virus  (15),  and  vulnerability  management  (14).  Practices  
with  the  lowest  adoption  rates  are  live  exercises  (3),  real  time  alerts  (4),  penetration  testing  (6),  and  
table  top  exercises  (7).  
 
4.3.10  Multi-factor  authentication  (MFA)  is  adopted  by  17  of  the  23  respondents.  This  continues  a  
trend  of  increasing  adoption  of  MFA,  from  22%  in  2016  to  60%  in  2017  to  74%  in  2019.  Consistent  
with  this  trend,  only  4  of  14  Major  Facilities  are  currently  not  using  MFA,  down  from  7  of  15  in  
2017  and  7  of  9  in  2016.  
 
4.3.11  Patching  times  continue  to  vary  greatly  between  respondents,  and  even  within  respondents  
depending  on  the  criticality  of  the  patch  [Q27].  For  critical  patches,  respondents’  response  times  
range  from  2  days  to  >3  months  to  implement,  with  the  most  common  answers  being  2  days  (9)  and  
1  week  (8).  (This  is  an  incremental  improvement  from  2017,  where  1  week  was  the  most  common  
response,  and  2  days  was  second.)  Outside  of  critical  patches,  response  times  vary  more  widely.  Most  
organizations  manage  “important”  patches  at  one  timescale  slower  than  critical  patches  (e.g.  2  days  
→  1  week;  1  week  →  1  month).  Unlike  in  previous  years,  however,  most  respondents  did  not  treat  
all  non-critical  patches  uniformly  (i.e.  important,  moderate,  and  low  all  addressed  in  the  same  time  
period.)  Instead,  most  respondents  implement  a  response  time  commensurate  with  the  patch’s  
criticality,  with  less  critical  patches  being  addressed  over  longer  periods  of  time.  
 
4.3.12  Incident  tracking  was  down  from  2017,  with  9  of  23  respondents  detecting  at  least  one  
incident  in  the  past  year,  and  4  respondents  detecting  3  or  more  incidents  [Q28].  (Compare  with  
2017,  where  12  out  of  20  respondents  detected  at  least  one  incident,  and  5  detecting  more  than  3.)  
As  in  previous  years,  there  appears  to  be  a  strong  distinction  between  incident  “detectors”  and  
non-detectors,  with  a  small  number  of  organizations  that  detect  several  incidents,  while  the  majority  
detect  none.  This  may  be  due  to  a  “blissful  ignorance”  effect,  where  most  organizations  simply  lack  
the  capability  (or  motivation)  to  detect  most  incidents;  or  possibly  due  to  differing  internal  
definitions  for  what  constitutes  an  incident.  
 
4.3.13  Of  the  9  respondents  who  listed  at  least  one  cybersecurity  incident,  the  most  commonly  
identified  programmatic  impacts  caused  by  those  incidents  were  the  interruption  of  remote  access  
(6),  the  impact  on  data  integrity  (3),  and  the  impact  on  institutional  reputation  (3)  [Q29].  
Respondents  identify  the  compromise  and  failure  of  servers  as  being  the  largest  operational  impact  
of  cybersecurity  incidents  (5)  [Q30].  
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4.4  Cybersecurity  Concerns  
 
4.4.1  When  asked  what  would  most  improve  their  cybersecurity  stature,  the  most  common  response  
was  “increased  cybersecurity  staff ”  (11),  followed  by  advanced  security  technologies  (9),  “senior  
management  commitment”  (8),  and  “larger  budget”  (7).  This  is  a  shift  from  previous  years,  where  
larger  budgets  tended  to  be  the  most  popular  response.  
 
4.4.2  There  was  no  clear  agreement  on  what  the  biggest  cybersecurity  gap  was  currently,  with  only  
improved  inventory  tools  (2)  and  improved  cybersecurity  staffing  (3)  receiving  more  than  one  vote.   
 
4.4.3  The  most  concerning  threats  respondents  face  are  “unauthorized  or  accidental  modification  of  
data”  (13),  “unauthorized,  malicious  network/system  access”  (10),  and  “loss  of  availability  or  
sabotage  of  systems”  (9).  Interestingly,  “email  viruses,  ransomware  or  other  malware”  was  not  
particularly  concerning,  with  only  3  respondents  selecting  it  (despite  being  able  to  select  multiple  
options).   
 
5  Conclusion  
This  year’s  survey  continued  a  trend  of  high  responses-rates  from  NSF  Major  Facilities,  providing  
valuable  insight  into  the  security  programs,  practices,  and  concerns  of  this  unique  community.  We  
hope  that  these  results  and  the  subsequent  analysis  provide  some  benchmarking  insight  and  inspire  
discussion,  particularly  for  Major  Facilities  and  projects  with  larger  budgets.  Looking  ahead,  Trusted  
CI  will  use  this  report  and  past  community  survey  reports  to  fuel  discussions  and  inform  its  services.  
Moreover,  we  will  look  for  community  feedback  on  changes  to  future  surveys  to  improve  its  salience  
to  the  community.  
 
Although  we  received  too  few  responses  to  claim  a  representative  sample  of  the  NSF  science  
community  as  a  whole,  the  high  response  rate  of  Major  Facilities  provides  greater  insight  this  subset  
of  NSF  facilities,  and  the  overall  dataset  should  still  offer  interesting  (and  sometimes  concerning)  
insights  into  the  state  of  cybersecurity  in  the  NSF  science  community.  Future  surveys  will  explore  
options  for  increasing  the  response  rate  of  smaller  projects,  such  as  the  use  of  an  abbreviated  survey  




Appendix  A:  Survey  
NSF  Community  Cybersecurity  Benchmarking  Survey  
Instructions  for  completing  survey  
Please  submit  only  one  response  per  institution,  project,  or  facility.  (When  in  doubt,  we  encourage  you  to  respond.)  
Completing  the  survey  may  require  input  from  the  PI,  the  IT  manager,  and/or  the  person  responsible  for  cybersecurity  
(if  those  separate  areas  of  responsibility  exist).  While  answering  specific  questions  is  optional,  we  strongly  encourage  you  
to  take  the  time  to  respond  as  completely  and  accurately  as  possible.  If  you  prefer  not  to  respond  or  are  unable  to  answer  
a  question  for  some  reason,  we  ask  that  you  make  that  explicit  (e.g.,  by  using  “other:”  inputs)  and  provide  your  reason.  
Trusted  CI  will  release  results  to  the  community  that  we  believe  provide  anonymity  to  the  individual  project  or  facility  
respondents.  
1.  Is  your  project  or  facility  an  NSF  Large  Facility  (or  "Major  Facility")?  
List  of  Large/Major  Facilities  --  https://www.nsf.gov/bfa/lfo/docs/major-facilities-list.pdf  
● Yes  
● No  
2.  What  is  the  age  of  your  project?   
E.g.  8  years  
Project  or  Facility  Budget  
If  you  are  unable  to  answer,  please  provide  a  reason  in  the  space  provided  
3.  What  is  your  project  or  facility’s  annual  budget?  
Estimate  to  1  or  2  significant  digits,  e.g.,  $3M,  $500K,  $23,000  
4.  What  is  your  project  or  facility's  annual  information  technology  budget?  
Estimate  to  1  or  2  significant  digits,  e.g.,  $1M,  $50K,  $23,000  
5.  What  is  your  project  or  facility's  annual  cybersecurity  budget?  
Estimate  to  1  or  2  significant  digits,  e.g.,  $0,  $50K,  $23,000,  $1.3M  
6.  What  expenses  are  included  in  the  cybersecurity  budget?  
Check  all  that  apply  
● Labor  
● Hardware  devices  (e.g.  firewalls,  scanner,  forensic  devices)  
● Software  licenses  
● Not  Applicable  
● Don’t  Know  
● Other  
7.  Has  your  organization  devoted  adequate  resources  (e.g.  budget,  personnel,  tools)  to  the  cybersecurity  
program  to  address  risks  deemed  unacceptable  by  the  organization?  
● Yes  
● No  
● Not  sure  
Project  or  Facility  Attributes  
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8.  Does  your  project  or  facility  have  a  lead  role  with  responsibility  to  advise  and  provide  services  to  the  
organization  on  cybersecurity  matters  (e.g.,  ISO,  CSO,  CISO)?   
● Yes,  full-time  
● Yes,  part-time  
● No  
● Don't  know  
9.  Approximately  how  many  FTEs  are  involved  with  cybersecurity  work  (programmatic  or  operational)  within  
your  project  or  facility?  
● None  
● More  than  0  up  to  .5  FTE  
● 0.5  to  nearly  1.0  FTE  
● 1  to  nearly  2  FTE  
● 2  to  nearly  3  FTE  
● 3  to  nearly  4  FTE  
● 4  FTE  or  greater  
● Don’t  Know  
● Other  
10.  Do  individuals  from  multiple  institutions  authenticate  to  the  resources  of  your  project  or  facility?  
● Yes  -  2  or  3  institutions  
● Yes  -  more  than  3  institutions  
● No  
● Don't  know  
11.  Does  your  project  or  facility  develop  or  maintain  software?   
● Yes,  interpreted  languages  (e.g.  PHP,  Python,  Ruby,  Perl)  
● Yes,  compiled  languages  (e.g.  C,  C++,  Rust,  Java)  




12.  If  you  develop  or  maintain  software,  what  policies,  processes  or  tools  do  you  use?  
Check  all  that  apply  
● Coding  standards  
● Source  code  repositories  
● Automated  testing  
● Continuous  Integration  
● Static  and/or  dynamic  analysis  
● Issue  tracking  /  vulnerability  management  
● Testing  policy  (e.g.,  regression  testing  of  patches)  
● Code  signing  
● Automated  documentation  tools  (e.g.,  pydoc)  
● Not  applicable  
● Other  
Cybersecurity  Program  
13.  Does  your  project  or  facility  have  a  cybersecurity  program?  
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A  "cybersecurity  program"  is  a  structured  approach  to  develop,  implement,  and  maintain  a  productive  organizational  
environment  with  appropriate  levels  of  information-related  risk.   
● Yes  
● No,  but  we  are  in  the  process  of  establishing  one  
● No,  and  we  have  no  current  plans  to  establish  one  
● Not  sure  
14.  For  which  groups  of  individuals  does  your  organization  have  relevant  cybersecurity  policies?  
Check  all  that  apply  
● System  operators  
● System  owners   
● Leadership  













16.  How  are  cybersecurity  policies  developed  and  officially  adopted  within  your  project  or  facility?  
Check  all  that  apply  
● IT  Manager  or  cybersecurity  person  is  responsible  
● A  formal  governance  board  or  group  has  been  established  to  authorize  the  policies  
● PI  or  other  project  or  facility  leadership  are  responsible  
● There  is  no  formal  authorization  or  adoption  process  
● The  host  institution(s)  provide  the  policies  
● Other  
17.  Which  of  the  following  actions  does  your  organization  formally  take  with  regard  to  its  cybersecurity  
policies?  
Check  all  that  apply  
● Develop  and  Adopt  (e.g.  have  a  formal  process  for  writing  policies  and  making  them  ‘official’)  
● Explain  (e.g.  provide  employee  training  on  the  policy)  
● Follow  and  Enforce  (e.g.  audit  policy  compliance  and  enforce  any  provisions  for  noncompliance)  
● Revise  (e.g.  periodically  review  and  update  policies)  
18.  What  control  (if  any)  has  your  organization  selected  as  its  baseline  control  set?  
A  "baseline  control  set"  is  a  predetermined  set  of  security  controls  used  as  a  default  for  organizations  when  selecting  
security  controls  for  their  assets.  Examples  of  baseline  control  sets  include:  the  CIS  Controls,  the  ASD  Essential  Eight,  
and  FISMA  Moderate  (via  NIST  SP  800-53).  
● No  baseline  control  set  
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● CIS  Controls  
● ASD  Essential  Eight  
● FISMA  Low  -  Baseline  
● FISMA  Moderate  -  Baseline  
● FISMA  High  -  Baseline  
● NIST  SP  800-171  
● ISO  27002  
● CSF  Framework  Core  
● PCI-DSS  
● Not  sure  
● Other  
19.  What  framework  or  additional  guidance  (if  any)  has  your  project  or  facility  adopted  for  how  cybersecurity  is  
done?  
Check  all  that  apply  
● NIST  Risk  Management  Framework  -  http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/fisma/framework.html  
● NIST  Cybersecurity  Framework  
● Trusted  CI’s  Guide  -  http://trustedci.org/guide/  
● ISO  (ISO/IEC  27005)  
● Open  Science  Cyber  Risk  Profile  (OSCRP)  
● Interoperable  Global  Trust  Federation  (IGTF)  
● The  parent  institution  is  responsible  for  the  framework  
● None  
● Other  
20.  Does  your  organization  have  a  process  for  selecting  and  deploying  “additional  controls”?  
"Additional  controls"  are  controls  selected  beyond  those  specified  in  the  baseline  control  set.  Reasons  for  selecting  an  
additional  control  include:  to  address  a  particularized  threat;  to  address  an  unacceptable  risk;  to  satisfy  a  compliance  
requirement;  or  to  satisfy  a  contractual  obligation.  
● Yes  
● No  
● Not  sure  
21.  Does  your  organization  have  a  process  for  selecting  and  deploying  “alternate  controls”?  
"Alternate  controls"  are  those  selected  instead  of  controls  in  the  baseline  control  set.  Reasons  for  selecting  an  alternate  
control  in  place  of  a  baseline  control  include:  improves  employee  quality  of  life;  better  addresses  the  organization's  




● Not  sure  
22.  Who  accepts  residual  cybersecurity  risk  (i.e.,  the  remaining  risk  after  reasonable  cybersecurity  controls  are  
established)?   
Check  all  that  apply  
● A  cybersecurity  person  
● IT  manager  
● System  or  process  owner  
● Senior  managers  or  PI  
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● An  individual  in  the  parent  institution  (external  to  the  project)  
● No  one  /  there  is  no  explicit  risk  acceptance  process  
● Don’t  Know  
● Other  
23.  What  external  cybersecurity  requirements  (if  any)  are  imposed  on  your  project  or  facility?  
Check  all  that  apply  
● State  or  federally  protected  Personally  Identifiable  Information  (PII)  
● Protected  Health  Information  (PHI)  
● Non-disclosure  or  contractual  agreements  (NDA)  
● Classified  information  -  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classified_information_in_the_United_States  
● FISMA  /  NIST  RMF  
● NIST  CSF  
● CUI  /  NIST  SP  800-171  
● Cooperative  agreement  terms  from  NSF  
● None  
● Don't  know  
● Other  
24.  What  kind(s)  of  identity  management  does  your  project  or  facility  employ  to  control  access  to  its  resources?  
Check  all  that  apply   
● The  parent  institution's  identity  management  
● Separately  maintained  project  or  facility  userid/password  
● Independent  project  or  facility  certificate-based  infrastructure  
● Federated  identity  management  technology  
● Other  
25.  What  programmatic  cybersecurity  safeguards  has  your  project  or  facility  implemented?  
Check  all  that  apply   
● Utilize  cybersecurity  maturity  model  to  assess  and/or  plan  program  evolution  
● Have  an  overarching  cybersecurity  strategy,  policy  or  plan  
● Have  a  roadmap  for  cybersecurity  improvements  
● Have  documented  cybersecurity  standards/baselines  for  employees  and/or  external  researchers  
● Inventory  critical  information  assets  
● Have  a  data  classification  scheme  
● Have  a  cyber  incident  response  plan  
● Have  business  continuity/disaster  recovery  plans  
● Require  periodic  cybersecurity  awareness  training  for  personnel  
● Conduct  risk  assessments  
● Monitor/analyze  security  intelligence  
● Have  an  Information  Security  governance  structure  
● Conduct  review  by  external  organizations  
● Utilize  programmatic  safeguards  of  parent  institution  
● None  
● Other  
26.  What  operational  cybersecurity  safeguards  has  your  project  or  facility  implemented?  
Check  all  that  apply  
● Multi-Factor  Authentication  
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● Centralized  logging  system  
● Vulnerability  management  
● Scan  for  vulnerabilities  or  configuration  errors  
● Physical  access  controls  to  critical  resources  
● Intrusion  Detection  Systems  /  Intrusion  Prevention  System  
● Network  firewalls  that  block  all  but  required  access  ports  /  protocols  
● Anti-virus  /  Anti-spam  /  spyware  /  phishing  solutions  
● Data  loss  prevention  /  file  encryption  
● Real-time  alerting  of  possible  attacks  /  anomalies  
● Internal  tabletop  exercises  to  gauge  organizational  response  
● Live  cybersecurity  exercises  
● Penetration  or  phishing  tests  
● Utilize  operational  safeguards  of  parent  institution  
● None  
● Other  
27.  How  frequently  are  patches  applied  based  on  the  severity  rating,  either  on  a  fixed  maintenance  cycle  (e.g.,  
monthly)  or  based  on  some  regular  cycle  after  a  patch  is  released?   
Choose  a  single  value  for  each  row.  If  multiple  values  are  appropriate  depending  on  system  type,  choose  the  shortest  interval.  
  2  Days   1  Week   1  Month   3  Months   >  3  Months  
Critical            
Important            
Moderate            
Low            
 
28.  How  many  cybersecurity  incidents  (i.e.,  any  event  that  puts  the  confidentiality,  integrity,  or  availability  of  






● Don't  know  
● Prefer  not  to  answer  
29.  For  the  cybersecurity  incidents  your  project  or  facility  experienced  in  the  past  year,  what  were  the  
programmatic  impacts?  
Check  all  that  apply  
● Loss  of  reputation  
● Decreased  confidence  in  data  integrity  
● Temporary  or  permanent  inability  to  collect  or  analyze  data  
● Interruption  of  remote  access  
● Sanctions  or  legal  actions  due  to  breach  of  sensitive  information  
● Significant  cost  of  incident  recovery  procedures  
● Cost  of  additional  remediation  procedures  /  controls  
● Does  not  apply  
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● Other  
30.  For  the  cybersecurity  incidents  your  project  or  facility  experienced  in  the  past  year,  which  have  had  the  
greatest  operational  impact?   
Check  no  more  than  2  
● Network  denial  of  service  
● Compromise  /  failure  of  servers  
● Compromise  or  infection  of  workstations  
● Compromised  /  lost  /  stolen  portable  devices  (mobile  phones,  laptops)  
● Theft  or  alteration  of  data  (e.g.  password  files,  HIPAA,  PII,  NDA,  prepublication  results)  
● No  detected  incidents  
● Other  
Cybersecurity  Concerns  
31.  What  would  most  improve  your  project  or  facility's  cybersecurity  stature?  
Check  at  most  2  
● Advanced  security  technology  (hardware  and/or  software)  
● Cybersecurity  steering  committee  
● Employee/researcher  reward  /  disciplinary  systems  
● Increased  cybersecurity  staff  
● Larger  cybersecurity  budget  
● Senior  Management  commitment  
● Other  
32.  What  cybersecurity  threats  are  of  most  concern  to  your  project  or  facility?  
Check  at  most  2   
● Unauthorized  or  accidental  modification  of  data  
● Exposure  of  confidential  or  sensitive  information  
● Loss  of  availability  or  sabotage  of  systems  
● Incorrect  network/hardware/software  configurations  
● Email  viruses,  ransomware  or  other  malware  
● Unauthorized,  malicious  network/system  access  
● Other  
33.  What  external  cybersecurity  services  or  community  resources  does  your  organization  utilize?  
External  cybersecurity  services  include:  incident  response;  security  as  a  service  providers;  third  party  network  
monitoring;  third  party  audits;  and  third  party  training  services.  
34.  What  external  cybersecurity  tools  does  your  organization  utilize?  
External  cybersecurity  tools  include:  network  monitoring  tools;  secure  configuration  management  tools;  and  asset  
inventory  tools.  
35.  What  are  the  cybersecurity  needs  and/or  gaps  you  are  currently  experiencing  or  expect  in  the  next  three  
years?  
36.  Comments  -  Use  this  space  to  record  any  additional  or  clarifying  comments.  
Feedback  
Thank  you  for  your  participation  in  the  Trusted  CI  Community  Survey.  If  you  have  any  feedback,  please  feel  
free  to  add  comments  below.  
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